Four Kennedy School scholars are part of a team who have explored what the UK might learn from Bidenomics. In this article, Vidit Doshi (Kennedy Scholar, 2022-2024), shares the findings from the project which he co-authored with Huw Spencer (Kennedy Scholar, 2020-2022), Julia Pamilih (Kennedy Scholar 2023-2025), Ed Balls (Kennedy Scholar 1988-1990), and Dan Turner (Honorary Research Fellow, University of Sheffield).
A little over a year ago, “Bidenomics” was hailed as a policy success: overseeing the fastest growth in the developed world in the aftermath of the pandemic; delivering a “soft landing” despite fears of stagflation; and pioneering a new paradigm in economic policymaking that the world could learn from. In the UK, then-Shadow Chancellor Rachel Reeves said she would “embrace the insights of an emergent economic consensus”.
After the Democratic Party lost the 2024 presidential election, by contrast, many commentators sought to pin the blame on the outgoing administration’s economic policy. According to critics, the stimulus was too big, hitting capacity constraints rather than boosting growth. Policy focused on marginal concerns, making them ineffective or irrelevant to most Americans. And inflation eroded the benefits for most workers. Unsurprisingly, enthusiasts for Bidenomics in the UK are now much more muted.
To answer this question, we conducted 15 in‑depth interviews with senior advisers to President Biden (e.g. Cecilia Rouse, Brian Deese) or economic policymakers that served in previous Democratic administrations (e.g. Larry Summers, Jason Furman). We published all of the transcripts of these interviews in full, which you can access here.
What we found
A deliberate fiscal gamble paid off
The US pursued one of the largest fiscal stimulus in history, $5.2 trillion, approximately 25% of GDP, via measures like the American Rescue Plan. Its aim was to “run the economy hot” and prioritise job creation over inflation, a gamble that contributed to record-breaking employment growth and wage increases for lower-income earners.
Creative destruction was the catalyst
Stimulus may have been necessary, but it wasn’t sufficient (as the experience of other countries shows). We found that labour-market dynamism shifting workers into more productive roles was the defining feature of their economic success. 15% of workers changed jobs through the pandemic. Business formation surged and generous unemployment benefits enabled job transition rather than retention (in stark contrast to the furlough-based systems we saw in the UK and Europe).
Productivity gap rooted in structural strengths
The productivity divergence between the US and UK predates Biden and opened up after the 07/8 financial crisis. It stems from the US’s scale, deep capital markets, human capital, and high‑skilled immigration; factors that Bidenomics reinforced, but did not create.
Industrial policy raised the stakes
A new industrial-policy agenda tied to national security (semiconductors, renewables, deep-tech) marked a shift from laissez-faire but we will never know their full effects given the Trump administration plan to roll-back much of the policy.
Communication was the weak link
Despite tangible gains in jobs and growth, the Biden administration failed to control the political narrative on inflation. When they were talking about jobs, people were talking about prices. Economic success is a necessary but not sufficient condition for political success.
For the UK, Bidenomics highlights clear lessons: fiscal boldness can deliver real gains in jobs and wages; economic dynamism depends on supporting workers through transition rather than retention; productivity growth relies on sustained investment in technology, skills and innovation; strategic industrial policy should marry national security with economic resilience; and ultimately, without a compelling narrative even good economics risks political failure (it isn’t just “the economy, stupid”).
Vidit Doshi (Kennedy Scholar, 2022-2024)
